Ciao Asad thanks for thinking through this. I agree that some of your points may be better addressed once we’ve got the MVP CoC up and running - to start with it can be safe enough to try to create strong foundations and open enough that we can amend as we go.
But to put some thinking out in response to your future scenarios
Can you give me a concrete example of behaviour that introduces more risk and complexity? My instinct is that a CoC would necessarily not capture this. Some decisions will bring more risk and complexity, with potential up-side (for example, a new fintech going through our Governance Process (in this case CP 5: the Pool Onboarding Process (POP) V2)) where launching as a pool on Cent Chain would be decided by token holders. If a proposer brings too much risk, and if the governance process works, they will not be added as a Pool.
We have the governance measures in the Centrifuge Governance Process and Framework to address many of the decisions that will ‘improve’ (or mitigate harm to) the protocol. But perhaps I’m missing your point…? Can we talk through some examples?
The Centrifuge Code of Conduct would apply to the behaviour of all participants when interacting with our DAO, protocol or on behalf of (i.e. using DAO comms tools, making forum posts, attending a conference on behalf of, completing work or entering a negotiation on behalf of). If they’re paid or unpaid but interacting with or representing the Cent DAO - the CoC should apply.
Yes, I’ve seen this happen often, and because of large token holdings or ‘brand influence’ there is a claim of legitimacy. Are you saying that we could try to uses the CoC to prevent bad proposals or bad actors or both?
I think that instead of trying to solely use the CoC to act as a stick for behaviour (especially the behaviour of participating in governance which is what I think you’re getting at) I would advocate that all parts of the draft Founding Docs are important (as well as other levers). Can we discuss how we use all the parts of Governance to help us make good decisions?
We have the governance process (i.e. the steps required to have a proposal passed by the DAO), governance itself (i.e. ideating, creating proposals, sharing, discussing, integrating feedback, convincing others, voting) reinforced by culture (what’s normal here, how we communicate), legal agreements (contracts between parties), the Founding Documents (including the CoC) as well as tokenomics.
To me these can be used together to drive understanding and alignment throughout the governance cycle: example
- Before someone makes a proposal they know what the DAO stands for (Shared Mission/Principles)
- Due to the Levels of Engagement they have a clear role in the community, necessary info and education and understand how to contribute
- Our Governance Process is clear and simple, and they follow the steps knowing that it enables due process
- They have seen how our DAO members behave and interact (both Principles, CoC and just straight out culture)
- Incentives and tokenomics are clear, people vote in what they believe serves best interest.
How all these tools of Governance can be used together, while still allowing for flexibility, benefit of the doubt and assumption of goodwill, and the capacity to dissent is the beautiful conundrum of governance that people have been trying to crack for thousands of years! Let’s add our little hammer 
As for allowing Anons: I disagree - I don’t know if there is a place for Anons in this DAO, it reduces accountability and grows chances of Sybil attack - of course it is very hard to eradicate this, but by having a rule about it at least we have something. Keen to hear from all those who disagree and why? 
Tagging some contributors who may have opinions on any of the above @SYZ @ctcunning @cassidy @Rhano @DamjanKM @lucasvo @robtorti