How do you handle CFG holders who are unable to pass KYC? I’m referring to holders from certain sensitive regions.
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Look at CFG’s price right now — I’m honestly furious. I’ve lost a lot of money. This trash proposal of yours completely disregards the community’s holders and supporters.
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I give up. You fucking win.
After reading these responses, it really feels like the equity conversion has already been decided internally and the governance vote is just a formality.
You’re asking CFG holders to approve a fundamental restructuring BEFORE showing us the fully diluted cap table, financials, final eligibility rules, shareholder rights, dilution framework, or even exactly what assets and businesses will sit under the equity we receive.
And here’s the part I really want answered:
How much CFG is currently owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the team, CNF, insiders, existing investors, partners, treasury-related entities, or affiliated wallets?
Will ALL of that CFG be allowed to vote on CP172?
And what percentage of the total voting power does it represent?
Because if insiders and affiliated entities already control enough CFG to determine the outcome, then what the fuck are we voting for?
Don’t call it a community governance vote if the outcome can effectively be decided by the people proposing the restructuring.
I trusted Centrifuge and held CFG for more than three years.
At this point, maybe I’m the fucking idiot for believing CFG holders would actually have a meaningful say in what happens to the value we’ve been holding all these years.
So please answer this clearly:
Who controls the voting power, how much do they control, and can they vote on CP172?
No vague legal language. No “details will come later.”
Just give CFG holders the fucking numbers.
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Thanks Bhaji — this is helpful and materially clarifies the structure.
If all existing team, VC and partner interests are currently held in CFG, all CFG converts into the same share class, and Centrifuge, Inc. will beneficially own 100% of the current and future subsidiaries, that addresses a significant part of the concern around a separate legacy equity layer.
The remaining governance question for me is therefore narrower:
before CFG holders vote on CP172, can we understand how treasury, unvested and other non-circulating CFG are treated, what future dilution may be authorized, and how the CP171 governance-restoration right operates during this transition?
I also understand that some securities disclosures cannot be made publicly. The key issue is ensuring holders are not asked to give up or modify governance rights before they have a meaningful opportunity to assess the economics and exercise the safeguards preserved under CP171.
You’ve pushed CFG into a fucking no-win situation.
At this point, even if you suddenly announced that the equity conversion was cancelled, I honestly don’t know how CFG could recover from this.
The trust is already fucking gone.
You introduced the idea that CFG’s long-term value should move into equity. You openly raised questions about the future relevance and liquidity of the token. And now CFG holders are stuck with two shitty outcomes:
Proceed with the conversion — without enough information to properly value what we’re receiving.
Cancel the conversion — and somehow expect the market to believe in CFG again after you yourselves undermined the entire investment thesis behind the token.
What the fuck were you expecting to happen?
I trusted Centrifuge and held CFG for more than three years.
Not anymore.
Congratulations. You didn’t just lose an investor.
From now on, I’m a fucking Centrifuge anti.
Fuck this.
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And now the whole governance story makes a lot more sense too.
You told us DAO governance was inefficient — low voter participation, execution bottlenecks, too slow to get things done — and gradually stripped CFG holders of meaningful governance power.
Under CP171, you paused active DAO governance while telling us that tokenholders would retain ultimate control and, quite literally, that “there is no equity business.”
Less than a year later, here we are: token-to-equity.
So was CP171 just the buildup for this all along?
Reduce the tokenholders’ power first, consolidate control, and then propose moving the value from CFG into equity once the business is finally gaining traction?
Maybe that wasn’t the plan. I can’t prove that it was.
But after everything that has happened, you’ve given me absolutely no reason to trust you anymore.
What a fucking joke.
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I’m done. I sold this token and managed to save what little was left — about a quarter of my original investment.
What pisses me off the most is that I trusted you. I kept averaging down and accumulating CFG because I believed in Centrifuge and where this project was going.
Now I hate myself for ever trusting you.
But I guess this is exactly what you wanted.
Now that the business is finally gaining traction, you probably want large institutions and long-term investors who will keep backing you indefinitely.
And people like us — smaller CFG holders who supported you before the business got to this point — have basically become baggage now, right? lol.
Well, congratulations. You got what you wanted.
Enjoy what you’ve built. I’ll be watching from the sidelines as CFG makes its way to $0.05.
Fuck.
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You’ve ruined people’s lives. We believed in you and supported you for years, yet you treat us like trash. Shame on you—may the same thing happen to you that you did to us.
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@itsbhaji I am from Mainland China. What I would like to understand is whether Centrifuge, Ogier, and CoinList are willing to design a workable and compliant participation structure for Mainland China, given the complexity of this jurisdiction.
If Mainland China residents ultimately cannot participate through the standard direct equity route, are you actively exploring or designing a trust structure or another compliant alternative that would allow existing CFG holders in Mainland China to preserve the economic exposure corresponding to Centrifuge equity, even if they cannot directly become shareholders?
Just thinking out loud. Why not turn the existing token into a “royalty token” where token holders get 10% of all revenue and at the same time all token holders automatically also receive shares in the company on a 1:1 basis. Stop the cash burn and token issuance. Get your feet under you before focusing on growth. CFG should be buying into Grove not the other way around.
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LOL. At this point, I genuinely have to wonder whether Centrifuge’s actual revenue is coming in materially below the $15M forecast that was previously communicated for 2026.
I’m not claiming that as a fact. I don’t have access to your internal financials.
But from the outside, your current behavior makes that question increasingly difficult to ignore.
I understand the basic CP172 structure: the proposal contemplates 1 CFG converting into 1 share. So the market price of CFG does not directly change the number of shares a holder would receive.
But that does not make the collapse in CFG irrelevant.
Long-term holders have watched the token lose enormous value, confidence has deteriorated, and yet there has been very little quantitative information provided publicly that could help the market understand how the underlying business is actually performing.
That is especially difficult to understand when many CFG holders have supported Centrifuge for years.
You have also publicly explained that moving to an equity structure could open access to VC and strategic capital that the token structure currently limits.
So naturally, some holders are going to ask:
Is revenue materially below previous expectations?
Is additional capital becoming more important than previously anticipated?
Is access to future equity financing one of the main reasons CP172 has become necessary now?
Maybe the answer to all of those questions is no.
But when so much remains undisclosed while CFG continues to lose value, you cannot seriously be surprised that long-term holders are drawing these conclusions.
I trusted Centrifuge for years.
At this point, that trust has been badly damaged.
If the reality is better than it looks from the outside, I genuinely hope you eventually prove us wrong.
Because right now, this whole situation looks fucking terrible.
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Your entire business is about bringing real-world assets onchain through tokenization.
And now you’re telling us that you can’t even preserve trust in your own token?
LOL.
You want institutions and future investors to trust Centrifuge with tokenized assets, while long-term holders of CFG are watching the value and credibility of your own token collapse.
Do you seriously not see the irony?
This is comedy.
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Why Centrifuge’s Founding DAO Principles Matter Now
I think everyone in the Centrifuge community — and everyone who cares about DeFi, open finance and decentralized governance — should pay close attention to what happens here.
Because this is no longer only about CFG or CP172.
It raises a much bigger question:
What does decentralized governance actually mean when the most important decision finally arrives?
Centrifuge deliberately chose to organize as a DAO, and its Founding Documents explain why.
They identified three core principles:
-
Decentralized Ownership — minimizing extractive concentrations of power and ownership.
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Open Access — anyone can propose changes or improvements.
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Distributed Decision Making — pushing decision-making outward from one to many.
The Founding Documents went further, explaining that these characteristics could help minimize “malicious gatekeeping and inequitable power structures.”
They also established principles of transparency, long-term thinking and integrity.
These were not incidental ideas. They were part of the governance architecture around which this community was built.
At the same time, the Founding Documents were realistic about the weaknesses of DAOs. They expressly said Centrifuge should “avoid governance overload” rather than asking every community member to vote on everything.
I completely agree.
The DAO should not decide every hire, partnership, deployment, product decision or commercial negotiation.
Labs/CNF need the freedom to execute quickly, build products, win institutional partnerships and grow Centrifuge.
But there is a fundamental difference between:
delegating execution
and
surrendering ultimate control over the economic and governance architecture itself.
That distinction matters enormously now.
For roughly seven years, community members have contributed capital, liquidity, governance participation, testing, discussion, integrations and support to help Centrifuge reach this point.
The protocol is finally achieving the institutional adoption and momentum that so many people worked toward.
And at precisely this stage, CP172 proposes a fundamental transition away from the existing CFG token/governance structure toward private corporate equity.
Without a meaningful opportunity for CFG holders to exercise the governance safeguard preserved under CP171, that risks becoming a 180-degree shift from the principles that helped build Centrifuge.
That creates a question much larger than whether equity itself is good or bad.
If a DAO can build a protocol, delegate authority for efficiency, expressly retain “ultimate control” and a mechanism to reclaim governance — but then the underlying economic and governance architecture can be fundamentally changed before that safeguard is meaningfully exercised — what exactly was the safeguard protecting?
That is why CP171 matters.
CP171 delegated substantial governance and execution authority for efficiency.
But it also expressly preserved tokenholders’ ultimate control and their ability to restore DAO governance.
Those concepts are entirely compatible.
A sensible model is:
Labs/CNF execute.
CFG holders retain ultimate authority over the limited fundamental decisions that define the system itself.
That could include:
-
fundamental CFG-holder governance rights;
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material changes to CFG’s economic/value-accrual framework;
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protocol-level value capture;
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major treasury or CFG-supply decisions;
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fundamental changes to delegated mandates; and
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restructurings that fundamentally alter or replace the role of CFG itself.
That is not governance overload.
That is governance doing the job it exists to do.
The Founding Documents themselves contemplated different levels of participation. Daily contributors could work closely on strategy and execution, while even passive tokenholders retained the ability to participate in governance.
In other words, the original model was never that every CFG holder should run Centrifuge every day.
It was that execution could be distributed and delegated without eliminating meaningful decentralized governance.
This is not an argument against Centrifuge succeeding, attracting institutions or becoming one of the most important pieces of onchain financial infrastructure.
Quite the opposite.
The more successful Centrifuge becomes, the more important it is that the principles on which it was built survive that success.
And this question extends far beyond Centrifuge.
Every successful DAO may eventually face the same tension:
Can we professionalize execution without centralizing ultimate power?
Can we attract institutional capital without decentralized ownership becoming merely a temporary stage that disappears once the network becomes valuable?
Can governance be delegated without that delegation ultimately consuming the governance rights that made it possible?
Centrifuge has an opportunity to demonstrate that institutional scale, professional execution and meaningful decentralized governance can coexist.
That is why the CP171 restoration mechanism is so important right now.
The RFC to reinstate Centrifuge DAO governance under CP171 is here:
CP171 did not permanently eliminate tokenholder governance. It expressly preserved the ability for CFG holders to restore it, and the forum and Snapshot route were retained for that purpose.
That mechanism is now being exercised.
The proposal is not asking the DAO to return to running day-to-day operations.
The question is narrower and more fundamental:
Should CFG holders retain ultimate authority over the limited economic and governance decisions capable of fundamentally changing what CFG is and what rights its holders have?
If CP171’s restoration safeguard is ever going to have substantive meaning, this is precisely the kind of moment when it should be available.
I encourage every CFG holder — and anyone across DeFi and open finance who cares about decentralized governance — to read the RFC, challenge it, improve it and participate in the discussion.
This should not be about taking sides against Centrifuge.
It should be about proving that professional execution and institutional growth do not require abandoning decentralized accountability.
Because how this question is resolved may ultimately matter far beyond Centrifuge.
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PSILINVESTMENTS, I agree with much of what you are saying, but I think we need to be much more realistic about where we are now.
CFG governance is not one-person-one-vote. Voting power is proportional to the amount of CFG held.
And CFG ownership is extremely concentrated among the largest wallets. Yes, exchanges, contracts and custodial wallets are included, so this does not mean “1,000 people own 98%.” But that does not change the fundamental problem: a relatively small number of large holders can easily outweigh thousands of smaller holders.
Some institutional holders have already publicly supported CP172 and stated that they intend to convert their CFG into equity.
So what practical protection does restoring governance under CP171 actually provide at this point?
Under CP171, the message from the team was essentially:
“DAO participation is low, decision-making is too slow, and execution is difficult. Give CNF/Labs more authority. But don’t worry — CFG will remain the sole value-accrual mechanism, there is no equity business, and CFG holders will retain ultimate control.”
Less than a year later, we now have CP172:
“The public token structure has become a constraint. It makes institutional fundraising more difficult. Let’s replace CFG with equity, enable traditional equity financing, and accept the possibility of future dilution.”
And yet the information CFG holders actually need in order to evaluate this proposal is still missing.
What is the company’s financial position?
What is the valuation?
What will the fully diluted cap table look like immediately after conversion?
How many total shares will exist?
What exact voting, information, liquidation and economic rights will those shares have?
Which jurisdictions, will actually be eligible?
What happens to holders who cannot or do not convert?
How will treasury CFG, unvested allocations and surrendered CFG be treated?
How much future dilution should existing CFG holders realistically expect?
Instead of receiving those answers before the vote, the position appears to be:
“Approve moving forward first. More detailed information will be provided later to eligible holders.”
Now you are trying to invoke one of the central safeguards promised under CP171 — restoring CFG holder governance.
And the response is effectively:
“Yes, you can pursue restoration. Go ahead. But that process does not pause CP172, and CP172 can continue separately.”
Then I have to ask: what exactly did “CFG holders retain ultimate control” mean?
If CFG holders cannot even pause or delay a proposal that fundamentally changes — and potentially replaces — CFG itself while they exercise the restoration mechanism promised to them under CP171, then what meaningful “ultimate control” was actually retained?
And even if governance is restored, the voting structure is still token-weighted.
It does not become one-person-one-vote.
If sufficiently large holders already support CP172, restoring DAO governance does not prevent those holders from dominating the vote anyway.
There is also a clear difference in incentives between ordinary CFG holders and large long-term investors committed to conversion.
For ordinary holders, CFG’s current market price and liquidity matter enormously.
But for an investor who already intends to convert and hold the resulting equity for ten years, a short-term collapse in CFG price may matter far less.
If the conversion remains 1 CFG = 1 share, then 10 million CFG still becomes 10 million shares whether CFG trades at $0.20, $0.10 or $0.05.
That does not mean price is completely irrelevant to them. But their incentives are clearly not identical to those of ordinary liquid-market CFG holders.
I am not claiming that CP171 was deliberately designed from the beginning as preparation for CP172. There is no evidence proving that.
But the sequence absolutely deserves scrutiny.
CP171:
Reduce DAO control
→ transfer greater authority to CNF/Labs
→ explicitly promise CFG as the sole value-accrual mechanism
→ explicitly state there is “no equity business”
→ promise that CFG holders retain ultimate control.
Approximately ten months later, CP172:
Replace CFG’s role with equity
→ enable traditional VC and strategic equity financing
→ accept future dilution
→ potentially reduce long-term liquidity support for CFG that is not converted.
And when CFG holders attempt to exercise the “ultimate control” safeguard promised under CP171, we are told that doing so does not pause CP172.
That is extremely difficult to reconcile.
So my question is simple:
If the restoration mechanism promised under CP171 cannot even pause a proposal that may replace CFG itself, what meaningful protection did the phrase “CFG holders retain ultimate control” actually provide?
And if CP172 is genuinely such a strong and fair proposal for CFG holders, then there should be no reason to rush the vote before publishing the fully diluted cap table, financial information, shareholder rights, jurisdictional eligibility and treatment of non-converting CFG.
Publish the information first. Then ask holders to vote.
Hong — I think this gets to the heart of it.
Centrifuge has been built for almost a decade around decentralized ownership, open participation and CFG-holder governance.
CP171 delegated substantial authority for execution while expressly stating that CFG remained the sole value-accrual mechanism, there was “no equity business,” and tokenholders retained ultimate control.
Less than a year later, CP172 proposes fundamentally changing that architecture.
That is exactly why the CP171 restoration process matters now.
This governance question should be decided by CFG holders as CFG holders. It should not depend on who may later qualify for private equity, which jurisdiction someone lives in, or whether someone ultimately chooses to convert.
The DAO was built around open participation. Every holder affected by a fundamental change to CFG should have the opportunity to participate under the ordinary CFG governance rules.
This is not about putting partnerships, hiring or day-to-day operations back to DAO votes.
It is about the most fundamental decision possible:
what CFG is, where future value accrues, and whether CFG holders retain meaningful control over changing that structure.
So whether someone supports or opposes CP172, the clean path is simple:
Complete the CP171 restoration process. Give CFG holders the information needed to understand the proposed restructuring. Then let CFG holders vote.
No special class of holder should need to be created for that governance question.
If CP172 is genuinely the best outcome for CFG holders, an open and informed CFG-holder decision should strengthen its legitimacy — not threaten it.
@itsbhaji I am not a professional in this area, and I do not have a legal or compliance team to advise me. There are many aspects of the eligibility requirements that I do not fully understand, so I need to know whether I am actually eligible before I can make my next decision.
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Update: RFC (TBD) — Reinstate Centrifuge DAO Governance Under CP171 is now live on GitHub.
The proposal has been submitted to the Centrifuge Proposals repository and remains open for community review and refinement during the RFC period.
For clarity, this is a separate governance-restoration proposal from CP172, which concerns token-to-equity.
Forum RFC:
GitHub PR:
Comments, amendments and constructive feedback are welcome.
I want to explain why I brought forward the proposal to restore Centrifuge DAO governance under CP171.
When CFG holders approved CP171, we were told:
“There is a single value accrual mechanism: CFG.”
“There is no equity business.”
“Tokenholders will retain ultimate control.”
And the structure was described as “reversible by design.”
Those commitments mattered.
The community spent years supplying capital, liquidity, governance and support while the RWA thesis was still uncertain.
Now Centrifuge has become important institutional infrastructure and tokenized finance is accelerating.
At exactly that moment, CP172 proposes a fundamental shift away from CFG-based decentralized governance toward a private corporate shareholder model.
I am not opposed to tokenized equity in principle.
But before making an irreversible change, CFG holders should be allowed to ask:
Have we even finished exploring what CFG itself could become?
CP171 explicitly committed Centrifuge to developing a sustainable value-accrual framework for CFG.
Since then, DeFi has moved incredibly quickly. Protocols such as Hyperliquid and Maple have shown how protocol growth can support powerful token-economic flywheels.
Centrifuge could explore its own model:
protocol revenue → CFG buybacks
fees → CFG burns
staking → economic participation
protocol growth → stronger CFG demand
The right model may be completely different.
But the community should decide.
Centrifuge is only now reaching the scale where genuinely powerful CFG economics may become possible.
Why abandon that possibility just as the economic engine is finally arriving?
There is also a capital-formation question that deserves proper community discussion.
One of the arguments for CP172 is that a corporate equity structure could make it easier to raise capital from investors. But finance itself is rapidly moving onchain, and an increasing amount of capital backing the next generation of protocols comes from crypto-native funds, treasuries and investors that already understand token-based networks.
With the right economics — sustainable revenues, buybacks, staking, utility and genuine value accrual to CFG — Centrifuge may be able to finance far more of its future growth through its own ecosystem and aligned onchain capital rather than becoming dependent on traditional outside equity.
Perhaps outside equity will still be valuable. Perhaps it will not.
But that is exactly the kind of strategic choice the community should be allowed to examine and debate before we permanently change the structure.
We should first ask whether Centrifuge can use the open financial system it helped pioneer to finance its next stage of growth.
At the same time, global capital is moving onchain.
Institutions are tokenizing funds, credit and securities. Stablecoins are becoming core financial infrastructure. A new generation is building AI agents, autonomous markets and financial applications around open, composable protocols.
If capital is moving onchain while Centrifuge moves away from token-based community governance, we risk moving structurally in the opposite direction to the ecosystem we helped pioneer.
And this is about something even more important than token economics:
Centrifuge’s identity and credibility inside the new open-finance industry we helped pioneer.
That reputation took years to build.
The next generation of builders is even more crypto-native. They will choose infrastructure based not only on technology and institutional relationships, but on whether they trust protocols to remain open, neutral and aligned with the ecosystem they are building in.
A fundamental shift from decentralized community stewardship toward a private corporate structure, without a deep community mandate, could change how future builders and users perceive Centrifuge for years.
Trust takes years to build and moments to lose.
Centrifuge itself framed the meeting of traditional finance and DeFi as “Suits vs Hoodies.”
The goal should be to bring the Suits onchain without losing the Hoodies, the open architecture or the community stewardship that made Centrifuge credible in the first place.
That is why CP171’s safeguard matters.
CFG holders were told they retained ultimate control and that the structure was reversible.
Before fundamentally changing Centrifuge’s identity and the role of CFG, the community should have the opportunity to decide whether DAO governance should be restored and whether a stronger decentralized economic model around CFG should be pursued instead.
This is not about automatically rejecting CP172.
It is about choosing, deliberately and transparently, what kind of protocol Centrifuge wants to be.
Centrifuge helped pioneer open finance. We should not abandon that identity just as open finance is finally becoming mainstream.
RFC — Reinstate Centrifuge DAO Governance Under CP171:
GitHub:
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Hi everyone - The discussion period has ended and we will open up the vote for CP172 soon. We’ll post the details and link to the vote on snapshot.org shortly. The vote will be open for 7 days and include a quorum of 4M CFG.
We recognize this is complicated and appreciate all the feedback and discussion on the proposal.
Thanks for the update.
For clarity and for the governance record: does proceeding with the CP172 Snapshot vote mean the authors have declined the sequencing request raised in the CP171 governance-restoration RFC?
That RFC is now actively exercising the restoration mechanism expressly preserved under CP171 and requests that CP172 not reach an irreversible conclusion until CFG holders have had the opportunity to complete that process.
If the CP172 vote is proceeding in parallel, could you also confirm whether any irreversible implementation of CP172 would occur before the CP171-restoration proposal has had the opportunity to reach its own CFG-holder vote?